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Humanizing Sociological Thought and
Practice*
Lynn M. Mulkey
University of South Carolina, Beaufort
ABSTRACT
This paper introduces a practical application of sociology. It attempts to
do so as a modest effort in perceiving varied images of the human and of
society. It makes available, as interventions for the treatment of
individual crises and for empirical verification, a set of presuppositions
about the features and consequences of human social nature. The
preponderance of social scientific theories and practices found in the
literature have a commonality germane to the definition and resolution of
social problems - horizontal change. An optional theory and
corresponding set of practices espousing vertical change focus less on the
maintenance and content of the social self or ego, and more on the process
and outcomes of identification with it The latter emphasis is a version of
clinical humanism not found in the rhetoric constituting sociological
practice.
Introduction
The domain of sociology called "clinical sociology" includes a
circumscribed set of features that distinguish it from other sub-fields of
sociology (Bruhn and Rebach 1996; Kallen 1995; Eve 1994; Glass 1991; Fein
1990; Berg and Smith 1985; Cocozzelli 1987; Fritz 1985; Freedman 1984;
Strauss 1984; Swan 1984).1 Jonathan A. Freedman, in a recollection of Saul
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Alinsky, refers to clinical sociology's characteristic reliance on sociological
theory and concepts as essential for developing approaches to change (1984).
In this vein, Melvyn Fein (1990) highlights what might be referred to as a
traditionally humanistic aspect of clinical sociology's focus on change - that a
social perspective is vital, indispensable to comprehending personal
problems.2 Clinical sociology continues to draw on the numerous traditions of
social thought - philosophical assumptions and presuppositions - to ground its
activities. Because as a sub-field, it is a relatively recent construct in the
history of ideas, there is ample room for articulation of sociological principles
and their implication for practice as well as for meta-theories that find
consistencies between theories and applications.3 This paper aims to advance
our understanding of clinical sociology by introducing a particular notion of
humanism in describing and explaining the relevance of sociological thought
for practice.
The proposition of a version of humanism in clinical sociology, begins
with and depends upon Fein's (1990) idea of the importance of society for
understanding the individual - "the role of social relationships in the etiology
of human distress." He reminds us that the human is a social creature with no
inherent relationship to itself or to things in the phenomenal world. As Emile
Durkheim (1964) theorized, individual behavior is virtually uninterpretable
unless one sees the whole of which it represents or is a part; the most
seemingly personal and individual behaviors have their roots in the
interpersonal, in "socio-" or "association." The form or structure of individual
behavior is understood strictly by seeing its contribution to the collective.
Through learning, feelings and actions are linked to the role prescriptions that
differentiate how persons are to associate in various ways to accomplish the
tasks of group life.
Melvyn Fein's assumption about the critical nature of role identification is
bom a cornerstone in the clinical sociology architecture and a foundation for
this extended consideration of theoretical and therapeutic options. In
particular, his interests in the disruption of social role attachments as having
devastating consequences led to his work on a resocialization perspective. His
formulation, comprehensive in that it is both diagnostic and prognostic of
difficulties troubling most people, acts as a springboard for mis investigation
in mat its concerns are with the significance of human role development and
maintenance. The present project shifts, however, from Fein's attention to the
mechanism of role identification and conservation as a horizontal adaptive
feature and attends to the vertical dimension of adaptation pertaining to role.
Statement of the Problem
The following discussion makes available as practical interventions and
for empirical verification, a set of philosophically/theoretically-derived
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presuppositions about the features and consequences of human social nature. It
distinguishes a clinical humanism approach that originates with the general
concept of human societies - the macro/micro and dialectical relationship of
the individual to the group (Ritzer 1988; Berger 1967) - and from clinical
sociology's specialized emphasis on the significance of society for
understanding and treating individual problems. The paradigm is defined
through discussion of developmental capacities of human self-consciousness,
namely the movement from an exclusive to an inclusive social self-
consciousness. This formulation is presented first as nine presuppositions of
practice: 1] Society, 2] Attend, 3] Segment, 4] Transform, 5] Sense, 6]
Residual, 7] Judge, 8] Motive, and 9] Consolidation, and then as interventions
applied in the treatment of individual crisis. (Refer to Appendix for a
summary of the presuppositions and interventions.) "Society" accesses a
domain of consciousness that reveals a sense of separateness between the
individual and society and situates the possibility of change at the level of the
individual. "Attend" presupposes two dimensions to awareness where a
person is reduced to and identified with social role or is an observer to its role.
"Segment" is a descriptor for a felt discrimination of the "self as not the other"
in contrast to the "other as the self." "Transform" presupposes the human
capacity to maintain an observer or subjective consciousness through the
disciplined recognition of both dimensions of awareness. "Sense" presupposes
the human capability for active versus reactive aspects of behavior. "Residual"
presumes the ability of persons to prioritize states of consciousness as
developmental with each stage as indispensable to total human experience.
"Judge" pertains to the human capacity in consciousness to bestow worth on
experience rather than to find worth in experience. "Motive" presupposes a
person's capacity for contentment in being as opposed to in doing or
achieving. "Consolidation" presumes a person's capability for making society
a reflection of human value in contrast to a source of human value.
Background: Locating Another Link Between Sociological
Thought and Practice
Humanistic consciousness, then, as it is employed in this work, is a
specialized rhetoric concerning the individual's relationship to society. It is a
referent to a type of maturity of human development from a fragmented and
exclusive attention to an inclusive attention (Thakar 1968). These two
distinctions of human awareness highlight and differentiate a range of human
experience and phenomena not often treated in the arena of social scientific
thought, nevertheless that have potentially profound effects for individuals and
society. This dimension of consciousness has been and might be characterized
as unconditioned awareness that developmentally, follows the conditioning or
socialization of consciousness. G.W.F. Hegel (1967) identifies this dimension
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of consciousness: "Self-consciousness has before it another self-
consciousness; it has come outside itself... First, it has lost its own self, since
it finds itself as an "other" being; secondly, it has thereby sublimated that
other, for it does not regard the other as essentially real, but sees its own self in
the other. It must suspend this its other self... It must set itself to suspend the
other independent being, in order thereby to become certain of itself as true
being." In other words, the juxtaposition of elements in the individual's
awareness of "I see you with my eyes" changes to "I see you through my
eyes." In the history of social thought, a similar idea of an observer to oneself
in awareness has been introduced in George Herbert Mead's (1962) "I" and
"me," in Peter Berger's (1963) "outsider" to society, and in Joseph Campbell's
(1990) "identifying with the still image of the mind."
To date, many of the practical applications of social scientific theory,
specifically, role theory and resocialization (Fein 1990) deal effectively with
what might appropriately be thought of as horizontal change. A set of
practices might also be available through a concept of vertical change.
Curiosity in the former is with the content of the social self or ego, and in the
latter, with identification with it Distinguishing horizontal change from
vertical change humanizes sociological thought and practice by making an
assumption about human nature; that it is developmental and that each level of
development has peculiar and distinct features and consequences for what it
means to be an individual in society.4 The first stage in human development is
the formation of me self as object; at mis stage, the individual is society, is
identified with it, equated with it, determined by it (Durkheim 1964). To be
sociologically unrespectable, simply, leg-hair shaving, for example, is a
common practice assigned to American females that is transformed from
social prescription to personal feelings of disgust upon encounter with a
woman with leg hair. More seriously for persons assigned the gender status,
female, that includes the socially valued attribute, fertility, high levels of
depression are found for those who are infertile. As a result of the social
interaction process, the individual becomes an object to itself, and while mis
process of self-objectification, self-commoditization, is a guarantee of the
evolutionary achievement of the human species and the survival of society, it
also is the basis for social and personal problems (Rosenberg 1988). The
status/role is a social inevitability, a category representing learned ways to
associate, given the absence in the human of a direct genetic determinant of its
behaviors or relationship to the world. The human comes to recognize itself to
itself and to others according to these societally prescribed and learned ways
of associating — hence, sociology, the scientific study of association. The
personal, personality or ego is thus the internalization and integration of
learned ways to associate. Self-preservation in the human is the
predictableness of the meanings we give to various lands of interaction or
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behavior — role relations.
Another stage in the development of human consciousness can be
conceptualized as the expression of self through role as opposed to as social
role. At this level of awareness, a person identifies with the observer, not with
the object of what it sees. The person can now separate in awareness, an
intrinsic value from a social value and will not experience depression over a
felt loss of itself (its learned repertoires for behavior).
The major contribution of those like Fein (1990) to clinical practice and
social change has been wrought by adapting persons to the experiential world
at one level of development; few therapeutic interventions exist for facilitating
the growth of persons to the self-through-role stage of self-development. Some
exceptions document observed differences in human behaviors (also affecting
changes in society) in relation to changes in hierarchical variables of human
self-consciousness, but are speculative about the factors that enhance
development from one level to another (Mulkey 1995; Sennett and Cobb
1972; Tiryakian 1968; Maslow 1962).
To extend the application of social thought to practice requires
considering the importance of this humanistic articulation of the boundaries
between the self and society. The following discussion objectifies this
intention by setting forth several presuppositions of a clinical humanism, or
for humanizing sociological practice, and then applies these concepts as
interventions in the solution of an individual problem. Vertical interventions
are presented alongside horizontal interventions; recall, a horizontal
intervention deals with role adjustment and assumes role attachment. A
vertical intervention deals with role adjustment and assumes role detachment
The Case of Forest Beech: Nine Presuppositions and Crisis
Interventions
A version of clinical humanism is constituted by the following
presuppositions and corresponding crisis interventions in the case of Forest
Beech.5 While these presuppositions are somewhat overlapping, each
represents a specific and mutually exclusive aspect of experience. (Refer to
Appendix for the significance of each presupposition.)
Forest Beech is a 41-year-old white American male who reports feelings
of sadness, depression, despondence, rage, and hopelessness after recently
losing a bitter court battle over the custody of his four-year-old daughter,
Grace. He believes his life is rained. He fears he can never be a father to
Grace in the exceptional way that he was to her in the past - he was somewhat
bom a "mother" and a "father." As background, Forest received a Ph.D. and is
currently employed as a university professor. Forest and his wife Cornell,
have a four-year-old daughter, Grace. About two years ago, Cornell became
board certified as a lawyer and promptly decided she no longer loved Forest
76 CLINICAL SOCIOLOGY REVIEW / 1997
and requested a divorce from him. She packed her belongings, including
Grace, and relocated to another state, miles away from Forest's residence.
Forest bemoans the fact that the law pertaining to custody, favors women in
that the courts adhere to traditional role definitions and the view that a child is
more deprived of nurturing resources when it loses a mother man when it loses
a father.
Presupposition 1: Society
Society presupposes that collective problems are individual problems. The
preponderance of specifications of the individual's relationship to the group
end with society as a determining as opposed to an influencing factor in the
individual's behavior. Emphasis is on the content and integration of the social
self or ego. To fully appreciate the domains of human experience, requires
investigation of the less examined aspects of consciousness, those not reduced
to identification with the ego. Such a form of humanism presumes then that a
societal problem cannot exist separately from the individual. Society is a
projection of individual consciousness (Berger 1967). This means we cannot
separate in awareness the person from the group and perceive the individual
problem as separate from the societal problem (Thakar 1968). Subsequently,
we do not seek separate solutions for social problems versus individual
problems. Feeding the poor does not ameliorate poverty. From mis first
presupposition of a humanistic approach to the definition and solution of
social problems, one infers that enthusiasm or anxiety over social reform must
be viewed as a problem in the individual's awareness. A societal issue is an
issue of personal consciousness and change must originate at the level of the
individual. Issues of racism, sexism, and ageism, become properties of our
own consciousness and this is a step toward identifying solutions. Gila
Hayim, in The Existential Sociology of Jean-Paid Satre (1980:2) states, "By
refusing to separate thought from life Socrates probably represented one of the
earliest forms of existentialism, that is, the philosophical view mat knowledge
and existence are inextricably bound together."
Consider the people at the Modello Housing Project, a poor, crime-
infested neighborhood in Miami. Instead of talking about raising more money
to rid the neighborhood of its prostitution and crack houses; instead of
directing people to act, humanism defines the problems of deviance, school
failure, truancy, delinquency, and welfare dependence as persons' habits of
thought about their lives. In answer to the question of what can be done in a
typical urban environment where more than 65 percent of families take or sell
drugs, where 85 percent of families are headed by a single parent, where the
school dropout rate is over 50 percent, and child abuse and neglect are an
everyday fact, the prospect of change, to the humanist, begins with change in
the way an individual thinks about the situation. Collective problems are
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created by individuals as reflections of their attitudes. We do not see the
world, we see only our projection of it.6 The implication of this first
presupposition of clinical humanism for crisis intervention is that matters of
human society are matters of human development Correcting society is not
the solution to societal and individual problems.
Intervention 1. The practitioner, from a horizontal (ego-protecting)
perspective aims to make Forest aware of his problem as one emanating from
the attributes of society — divorce and separation rates, the breakdown of
spousal and parental loyalties and inequalities and the legal program that
attempts to compensate for failing social arrangements. Society is responsible
for the loss of Forest's role as father. As Forest suggests, the American legal
system has deprived him, unfairly, of an identity that is vital to his sense of
personhood, agency, and human value. An intervention from this perspective
must encourage Forest to appeal his case and to bring change in the legal
system espousing an androgynous standard for the parent's role as a remedy
for Forest's feelings about the restitution of justice in his case. It follows that
Forest's relief depends wholly upon changing the system; if the system does
not change, Forest continues to be in crisis. From a vertical perspective, a
strategic intervention is to analyze Forest's problem as a "non-problem." The
practitioner would explain to Forest that he is a person who holds a role, but
who is not the role. The loss of his role is not the loss of his personhood or
inherent value. He can either accept the constraints of the system or, if he has
an opportunity, can represent a case for more equitable role responsibility
under the law. Forest's sense of well-being is contingent upon changing his
understanding of the problem; through this understanding he changes the
system. Because he assumes he is intrinsically whole, he represents as
opposed to derives wholeness by changing society.
Presupposition 2: Attend
Attend presupposes a comprehensive awareness. Emphasis in the analysis
of human consciousness is heavily on the construction, substantive
significance, and consequences of role and identity formation and lightly on
relationship to role(s). The individual's relationship to its social roles can be
thought about hypothetically in terms of types of attention: exclusionary,
concentrated, and fragmented versus all-encompassing (Thakar 1968).
Relationship to role is a process of development of consciousness where an
exclusive attention can be distinguished from an inclusive attention.
Operationally, this means, pertaining to exclusive attention, a
concentrated or fragmented segment of experience. Fragmentation refers to
the individual's recognition (value) of itself to itself and to others as limited to
its roles. For example, the military role achieves in the development of the
ego, the ability of a person to mink of the same human protoplasm as friend or
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enemy. The individual comes to anticipate the action of the enemy toward it -
"That person expects me to kill her." Then she strikes first by killing the
enemy. A friend, she will hug. Note that in human social consciousness, the
perception is not of the person but of the meaning assigned to the person. The
Marine is not a person, but a fragment of valued meaning, in this situation, a
friend or an enemy. The challenge to maturity then is to understand that
humans do not relate to humans per se, but to fragments of the humans
defined by their roles. Exclusive attention is a mental activity, a concentration
that attends to one thing at the exclusion of other things, whereas an all-
encompassing attention is a total awareness, emergent upon the individual's
realization of itself as an observer to its role. Maturity is the challenge to the
reduction of the person to fragments of behavior. The stockbroker, for
example, jumped out the window when the stockmarket crashed.
Exclusive attention as a generic principle of social life applies not only to
the view of a person toward itself and to others, but also to the phenomenal
world, in general. While preparing my coffee today, I experienced two
perceptions of some whelk shells I had picked up from the shore that were
now sitting on my kitchen counter. I caught myself giving my attention to the
irregularities of one of the shells, particularly a small chip on one part of the
shell that I compared to the others which had no chips and were symmetrical
and intact. I acknowledged that at one level of my perception, one shell was
perfect and good and the other, was not. One experience finds worth in the
object and the other bestows worth on the object Applied to the shells, this
distinction means I like only one shell or I can like both - two modes of human
action, one more comprehensive than the other (Mulkey 1997).
The implication of mis second presupposition for clinical practice is for
fostering the ability of the individual to experience a stable and consistent
experience of itself, that is invincible, independent of its social situation. The
infertile female, for example, understands that her social value is influenced
by society's strategy for population management, reproduction, and care of the
young. Perhaps she comes to see that in an age of artificial insemination
practices, the value of the individual according to its marital status is
questionable. Peter Berger (1963) expresses a similar sentiment about the
value of the person according its color and questions whether race is a
legitimate social category in the first place. The defense of any category is not
the defense of a person, but the person is able to define and employ its social
forms as the hand is used to save or destroy a life. Role is not the person; the
person is a stable entity outside of role, not a fragment of experience identified
with role.
Intervention 2. From a horizontal perspective, the stability of Forest's
behavior depends upon the maintenance of his role as father. Restoration of
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his stability would be for him to remarry and have other children, to adopt a
child, or to volunteer at agencies that provide resources for disadvantaged
children. From a vertical perspective, Forest's stability is retrievable through
his recognition of himself as a stable entity outside of his role as father. By
borrowing from the interactionist perspective, Forest would be asked to
envision himself doing something — for example, driving Grace to the dance
studio. In doing this, he becomes aware of two aspects of his consciousness,
the subject or observer dimension and the object or social self aspect of his
consciousness. In realization of this separation, the identification with the
object aspect of consciousness is replaced with identification with the observer
aspect of consciousness. At this level of awareness, Forest no longer
experiences a loss of himself. Forest's experience of himself is all-inclusive in
that his sense of agency is extrinsic to his role. He is (aware of himself as
present) whether that includes or does not include fatherhood.
Presupposition 3: Segment
Segment presupposes discrimination or differentiation. Fragmentation is
an inevitability of social differentiation and order not founded directly in the
genetic make-up of the species. It results, simultaneously in discriminations
between persons according to their socially defined and valued attributes of
age, race, gender, religion, class, and others. The human must differentiate its
relations to persons in a predictable way. Self-preservation, as mentioned
earlier, in the human is defense of its meanings (roles as categories of
meaning). Social order is an achievement of society when society lodges itself
in the person as an ego, an individual representation or part of the whole
template of human relations. Mentioned earlier, the Durkheimian
comprehension of society is one in which individual behavior has no inherent
origins and is incomprehensible without perceiving it as a form determined by
the part it plays in the system (1964). The person at the social level of its
experience is fragmented; discrimination is the reduction of the self and
others, in perception, to a fragment of experience. Ultimately, and of great
importance, is the "other" is experienced as different than and separate from
the self. Identification with role has a way of fooling the individual into a felt
naturalness about who it is to itself and to others in its commitments and
behaviors. For example, seemingly the intense bond formed between a mother
and a child feels instinctual, but society has ordained, in the name of its
ongoingness, that the human learn to regard its biological offspring,
particularlistically, and beyond any other person it encounters in a lifetime.
The point is, however, that in the process of this styling of group relations, the
individual at this level of development in consciousness, loses touch with its
fundamental oneness with others. It is as if no one really matters but mis one,
my child. And here we find the mechanism of the hate group. Humanism
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purports to encourage the awareness of the individual beyond the level of its
fragmented social discriminations.
Intervention 3. From a horizontal framework, Forest would experience
himself as father, as other than daughter, or mother, etc., as a social necessity.
The perception of himself is in stark contrast to other selves; correspondingly,
this means the absence in awareness of the other as the self. The intervention
from this angle would deal with Forest's attachment to his role as father and
his need to maintain this repertoire of learned ways to associate in his
interaction with Grace. This intervention recognizes Forest's reduction in
experience to or his direct dependence on his role as father. The fragment of
fatherly behavior is a major feature of Forest's behavior and his felt loss of his
self-value is reduced to the chunk of that ego known to himself and to others
as father. This understanding would motivate Forest to prioritize his efforts to
restore his role of father, or to take on proxy paternal roles. A vertical
solution to Forest's reduction of self value to role value would be to facilitate
his awareness of himself as discriminatory. He is asked to identify the
experience of some persons as more important to him than others. Personhood
then becomes knowable to Forest at another level as something universally a
property of all persons. He is subsequently released from his anger and
despondency because he is able to experience himself and others beyond the
reduced and fragmentary mental category of father or daughter. Fatherhood
is a discriminating expression of who he is, not of who he is. Discrimination is
an occasion for Forest's development in awareness of the energies which drive
all individual action, but in a variety of expressions.
Presupposition 4: Transform
Transform presupposes the absence of reformation. Role identification
presumes the social and ego organization of consciousness into conscious,
sub-conscious and unconscious dimensions of the whole consciousness. These
elements cannot be suppressed in their influence and are typically reformed as
opposed to transformed. Reformation pertains to how persons are taught to
adapt horizontally by retaining their attachment to a role rather than by
shifting to expression through a role. Military personnel who have been in
combat routinely experience post-traumatic stress disorder because they
cannot integrate the conflicting values embedded in the military and civilian
roles. The individual who experiences its value as a professional athlete and
loses a limb in a car accident, is reformed by taking on a value in a new
professional role. The mother whose children leave home is reformed through
a new social identity as a student returning to school.
Transformation, however, is a vertical shift in adaptation. It occurs
through a person's realization of a residual dimension of consciousness that
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remains unconditioned (Berger 1967). Reformation relocates the person's
experience of itself in another social role; transformation grounds the person's
sense of itself outside of its role as an observer to its role.
The significance of transformation is for adaptation. Perhaps the hallmark
of human adaptation is the ability of the individual to retain a sense of itself
despite external influences. At primal levels of development, the
consciousness of the individual is the group (Berdyaev 1944). This notion is
found in psychologies and sociologies that assert the basic urges as ultimate
determinants of behavior; a humanistic social science is preoccupied with
another domain of human experience where meta-values replace primary
values (Maslow 1962). Human fulfillment and identity is obtained not from
self-defense, but in the so-called giving up of the self. The human will
transcend the value of its physical life on the basis of another level of
motivation — what Maslow called "intrinsic conscience beyond superego."
In the movie production, The Rainman, Raymond's brother comes to recognize
and feel about him beyond his physical and socially ascribed values as idiot
and genius; he matures to understand idiocy and genius both as occasions for
expressing the total regard and all-embracing value of another human being.
One position in consciousness is life-restricting by diminishing the experience
of the value of the whole human being.
Intervention 4. A horizontal intervention presupposes reformation.
Reformation relocates the person's sense of itself in another social role;
transformation enhances human adaptation because it grounds the person's
sense of itself outside of its role as an observer to its role. From a horizontal
perspective of intervention, Forest understands that his happiness is available
through reformation; that he can be resocialized to proximate roles. He can,
for example, have another child, or he might learn that an ex-spouse is not an
ex-parent and that he can find new and creative ways to associate with Grace
as a father. A vertical intervention presupposes transformation that occurs
through Forest's realization of a dimension of consciousness, one that remains
unconditioned He is asked first to observe himself as a father and then to
focus, not on what he sees — father— but on himself as present as seer. As
sequel, he is queried about whether he clearly experiences the sense of
independence from being one or the other. Transformation is for Forest, a
restoration of consciousness, a conscious acknowledgment and return to and
focus on observing rather than on being the object, that thereby expands and
makes otherwise unavailable, a realm of meaning of human experience.
Presupposition 5: Sense
Sense presupposes a distinction between sensory experience and the
interpretation of sensory experience. Fragmentation, as designated earlier,
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refers to a partial awareness of reality by concentration. As Thakar (1968)
observes, concentration directs the individual's attention to one point at the
exclusion of the rest of the phenomenal world. This exclusive activity,
opposed to an all-inclusive attention, concentration, represents how the mind
interprets sensory perception. The interpretation of sense reflects regularities
of conditioning so the same sense might be interpreted, or experienced,
variously as in ethnic variations in response to pain (Zborowski 1952). The
behavioral response is not directly to the sensory experience but to the calling
attention to it. The meaning assigned to the experience, according to social
categories such as ethnicity, age, religion, determines behavior. These
behavioral orderings are lost to consciousness. They act as determinants of
behavior by fragmenting the response in accordance with the meaning
assigned to sense. The same mechanism of concentration constructs an
association of physical attributes and sensations with various role assignments;
chronology, for example, becomes socially assigned and constructed meanings
attached to old, adolescent, and young. Old means worthlessness and youth
means worth; infertility is associated with depression; sexuality is good or bad
when it is aligned with social role (son toward mother and father toward
daughter become incestuous roles and evoke guilt and shame).
A humanistic foundation of sociological practice seeks to debunk the
mistaken notion and felt understanding of human action as individual action
and to replace it with the notion of reaction. In this, the sociological
imagination or form of consciousness, the individual has an alternative to
harmful defensive behavior (Mills 1959). The initial perception results from
the undeniable validity of the individual's sense of being in society, but society
is so inextricably a part of the person, it forgets this predicament Human
behavior, can be understood and operative from a second vantage point, where
the person has a window on itself. In the perception of its own history, it
becomes comfortable with itself. The female in a hunting and gathering
society might be polyandrous and comes to want or prefer six husbands; the
survival of her offspring in mis economy depends upon her coming to
recognize herself to herself and to others in this manner. A post-industrial
subsistence strategy promotes androgynous gender roles to accomplish the
task of maintaining economic life. Neither the defense of the economy nor the
defense of androgyny are directly salient to the well-being of the individual
from this fifth presupposition of a humanistic clinical sociology.
Intervention 5. The horizontal intervention based on this presupposition
in the case of Forest is promoting an understanding of the primacy of feelings,
the primacy of sense. This means that Forest is given to understand the
fundamental importance of his feelings about the situation of the loss of his
father role as a basis for action. A vertical intervention would focus on
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feelings, less as a sensory reaction and more on feelings as an interpretation
of sense. Forest would be asked first to consider and to become aware of his
own conditioning — that the felt naturalness of his rights, as a father, are as
learned as his personal tastes in food. One version of a dead animal as
opposed to another will produce a reaction of appetite or regurgitation,
respectively. His acknowledgment of what he senses as distinguishable from
what he interprets as sense breaks his tenacious and unconscious reliance on
his social role as father. From this vantage point, he is able to act, not react,
to the situation.
Presupposition 6: Residual
Residual presupposes a conscious awareness of the conditioned response.
This comprehensive awareness does not snuff out conditioned behavior, but
emerges through practiced observation of the conditioned response. All-
expansive awareness is thus a state of no commitment, a state of no
identification. To paraphrase Nicolai Berdyaev (1944), social philosopher, in
primitive consciousness, the consciousness of the individual depends upon the
consciousness of the group, but this is not the final condition for humans;
society is a special reality, a degree of actuality. For example, the idiot and
the genius are statuses or positions assigned to physical attributes that invoke a
predictable sentiment or value and normative, behavioral response. Cognition
becomes recognition, a residual capability of consciousness that makes the
individual aware of its attachment to these properties.
Intervention 6. The horizontal intervention assumes the final goal of
human development as "oneness" of self-consciousness with social role, and
repairs the self by restoring or modifying the role. A vertical intervention as it
pertains to this presupposition facilitates Forest's awareness of his felt
identification with his role. He is encouraged to achieve an understanding
that, for example, when he is attached to his role as car owner, the social
value of his car, and his ability to maintain its functioning determines his
sense of happiness; he is one with the car. When Forest becomes aware of his
attachment to his role as father, he is automatically consoled by the
realization that whatever impedes or facilitates his fulfilling his role will
determine his sense of self. He understands that his self-awareness has been
directly and finally related to role maintenance. He learns to routinely and
systematically distinguish in his experience his felt dependence on external
role-maintenance activities as a source of fulfillment. He is asked to notice
how insuring regular contact with Grace, or perhaps seeking assistance with
job relocation, restores his sense of well-being. This intervention
acknowledges a sequel domain of human experience that allows Forest to
differentiate two modes of experience, one built on and respectful of the other.
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Via his contemplation of how he would remain determined in his negative
feelings by his inability to fulfill his fatherly responsibilities, gradually, he
comes to experience a sense of wholeness not obtained from role; rather,
wholeness becomes represented through role.
Presupposition 7: Judge
Judge presupposes non-reactive attendance. The moment I attend to
something, my mind has already recognized it and labeled it (values it). The
label is associated with thought and feelings ascribed by social role. So before
we are aware of the totality, we have approved or disapproved the object of
our attendance. Here is an example (Thakar 196S). A person may address a
family member. The person is looking at the image that the mind has created
about the other person. Persons are viewing each other through the socially
conditioned template of their judgment, or the standards and values of the
mind. People are really not looking at each other. Persons are projections —
a "husband," a "wife," a "child" — and if the projections are not isomorphic
there is conflict between "persons," and they no longer "love each other."
People are uncomfortable with the world unless it allows them to project onto
it. We necessarily differentiate our relations with others in terms of feeling
and action to insure a predictableness to life that is not inherently available. So
we realize that when we observe a person through the mind's exclusive
attention to role, we are not looking at him at all, and in that realization, a
sense of the whole being becomes available in perception. The implication of
this feature of humanism for the definition and solution of individual and
societal problems is for a total perspective on experience. Without a total
perspective on experience, the human is left to a dichotomized realm of
perception; fulfillment is conditional. Some things become sacred and other
things are profane (Durkheim 1964). In terms of clinical outcomes, the
individual is bored with work or its spouse and its children. Nonjudgment
beyond social judgment is a presupposition of humanism that highlights the
capacity of the human to maintain a feeling of wonderment and euphoria in
whatever it does. The person can attend without liking or disliking. Peter
Berger (1963) captures the essence of wonderment in his remarks about
sociology as a form of consciousness that is unrespectable, that attends to
whatever everyone else ignores. What is unrespectable has potential for
wonderment Wonderment precludes the possibility of depression, suicide,
and other individual/social diseases.
Intervention 7. The horizontal approach to the problem would be to
defend Forest's rights as a father and to devote his energies to restoring his
role as father or to building new forms of fathering behavior. The vertical
intervention here would be to ask Forest to identify from his experience his
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ability to bestow worth on experience; not to find worth strictly in the
experience (horizontal intervention). He might be asked to recall an
experience of "infatuation," when consciousness looked past any learned and
undesirable attributes of another person. As with the Rainman, both idiocy
and genius are occasions for the expression of love, Forest can come to
appreciate that being a father or fatherless are both occasions to express love.
Beyond mourning the loss of his role and learning a new role, Forest can
interpret his loss of Grace in his household as an opportunity to build new and
creative ways of loving her or even to accept that his ability to father Grace is
limited. Neither situation determines his happiness.
Presupposition 8: Motive
Motive presupposes the absence of motive. Humanism makes apparent
the individual's reliance on its social role for developing a sense of itself as a
locus of control and center of action in relation to others and things. Yet,
humanism also asserts that mis reliance is hierarchical and not final as a
determinant of human behavior. And that the human reduced to this level of
reliance becomes perverted in its capacities to function individually and in
community. The individual who is identified with her role as a mother feels
threatened by the separation of her offspring and her relationships with her
children will be confounded, contaminated by her motive to hold on to mem.
She may resort to deviant modes of relationship; for example, she might
demean the acceptability of her offspring's dating partners or might
unconsciously become ill to insure the association with another that affirmed
her. Her sense of being an organism in control of its behaviors and others' is a
styled and habitual dependence.
Humanism presupposes that a person's reliance on society is not final; the
grounding of human identity outside society permits the person to imagine
itself feeling and acting in particular ways, but its source of control is not
dependent on others, and is self-contained. A person resting in its ability to
imagine does not expect from others. The mother who needs her child cannot
give to it in a manner that fosters its development A motiveless state of
awareness means persons are related to others without motives. Motive is
evident in consciousness when something is perceived as a need. Instrumental
orientation of consciousness results in the person's inability to feel comfortable
in the present; it is continually anticipating for a sense of security (Lee 1950).
A student is unhappy as a person until it achieves a grade of "A." A female is
unhappy as a person until she attains a physique of less than twelve percent
body fat A motiveless level of human awareness circumvents the
consequences of greed and of plundering others for self-preservation. This is
a commentary on the individual consciousness that objectifies as societal
attributes such as poverty and war and crime.
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Intervention 8. The horizontal intervention of this presupposition is for
goal-attainment. Forest's state of mental health obtains from his linear
consciousness, his ability to achieve some end. Resolution of the problem
comes through attaining some end. In this case, the quantum that would make
Forest whole would be his custody of Grace. The vertical intervention of this
presupposition encourages Forest's motivelessness by asking him to attend
systematically to himself feeling and acting. The emergence of the observer in
his consciousness provides him with a sense of invincibility that is not
interrupted by or constituted by the behavior of others. Fulfillment is found in
a state of just being present and this perception replaces a state of having to
do something to feel meaningful. His experience of self is not predicated by
his role relations. With or without Grace, Forest can find contentment without
having to manipulate people to affirm his presence; others merely confirm
what he can now experience as himself.
Presupposition 9: Consolidate
Consolidate presupposes the experience of intrinsic value. The
presupposition of consolidate in humanism posits that we have never seen the
world before but only our conditioned responses to it. Consolidate, like
residual awareness, is a by-product of this very understanding; the individual
knows beyond its conditioning. Persons are their reactions until they are
exposed to their attention. Residual awareness is the ability to experience two
properties of the present; fusion is the perception of bom properties as one.
The implication of this feature of development in consciousness is for
restoration of the person's sense of full participation in life.
Intervention 9. A horizontal approach to Forest's loss of his father
identity as it pertains to consolidate, means his understanding of his sense of
loss as coloring his view of the whole of life. For the moment, the whole of life
is reduced to his sense of loss; therefore, this understanding would lead to
efforts that result in replacing the loss with a comparable role. The sense of
all is well in life is conserved to the repair of this role loss. A vertical
approach to Forest's loss of Grace is through a process of debunking the
authority of role as final in determining his individual happiness. Forest is
asked to consider his human value as neither sacred because he is a father nor
profane when he is not. Consolidation of self-consciousness is fostered when
Forest practices finding his invincibility — himself, essentially as onlooker to
himself. He then conveys that his perception of himself as a father is less
important and fulfilling than his ability to experience himself, fundamentally
as the perceiver. He is then able to assess and respond to family law as a
reflection of his intrinsic value rather than as an act to reconstitute and
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restore his value.
Conclusion
This paper has introduced a humanistic version of the definition and
solution of individual and societal problems. In this it sets forth several
presuppositions of a philosophical base that engender the distinction in the
human adaptive response as identification and non-identification with social
role. This brand of humanism espouses a maturity or change of
consciousness, not change of society, as the solution to problems of the
individual. The regularities and determinants of daily activities remain
beyond the purview of normal vision and the realization of how human
behavior is constrained by others through shared rules for cooperative life
(social structure) moves the individual to another level of development in
consciousness. The person becomes aware of society's power to confer upon
it a social identity, and in that understanding is able to experience a fuller
identity that can change society. Each identity has specific outcomes; the first
identity, or self, equates itself with its social role, and the second self
expresses itself through its social role. Socially assigned identities like "race"
require less defense and are questioned as points of attention in the first place.
Existence consists of the relative contributions of social-self maintenance and
defense, or a stable mode of being outside of role. Dwelling on painful
experiences of the past can keep people from experiencing an innate mental
health all persons possess. This approach is being implemented to help poor
African Americans in Miami, Native Americans in Minnesota and victims of
alcohol and drug abuse nationwide. For mis humanist, problems are like
mirages that exist when viewed from a particular state of awareness and
perhaps such a humanistic perspective, as a basis for sociological practice, is,
for some clinical cases, like sound that reaches places light can never reach.
The several presuppositions set form in this paper are a theoretical basis for
further conceptual specification, systematic empirical investigation and for
proposed interventions for the amelioration of individual and social problems.
And to make an end is to make a beginning.
The end is where we start from.
We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.
from T. S. Eliot, Little Giddings
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Appendix
Presuppositions and Interventions of a Clinical Humanism
Clinical Humanism considers what and in what manner, societal factors
influence the human sense of well-being. It addresses effective interventions
in the treatment of individual crisis and presumes vertical as opposed to
horizontal interventions. Vertical treatment approaches highlight the
individual's relationship to role; horizontal clinical approaches (presented here
for contrastive purposes) highlight the person's identification with role and the
significance of role maintenance.
1. Society
Collective problems and social reform originate in individual problems.
Society is a product and projection of individual consciousness. Matters
of human society are matters of individual development. Correcting
society is not the solution to individual and societal problems. For
example, feeding the poor is not a solution to poverty.
Horizontal Intervention: Change society or the system.
Vertical Intervention: Change the individual's understanding of
society and the system.
Significance: Focus on looking to the person, not to society as the source
of individual and societal change.
2. Attend
Attention/consciousness has properties of both exclusive or inclusive
awareness. Exclusive awareness is in the service of human social nature,
by directing the individual's behavior toward others according to
fragments of valued meaning (roles). For example, while the person feels
that s/he is a stockbroker, if the stock market crashes, s/he jumps out the
window. Realization of this basis for behavior brings to consciousness an
inclusive awareness where the individual is not identified with a role, but
experiences itself as an observer to its role.
Horizontal Intervention: Identification with self as object of
consciousness makes the person's sense of well-being dependent on
its role and requires, in treatment, efforts toward role maintenance
and resocialization.
Vertical Intervention: Establish basis for identification with self as
subject or observer of self as object
Significance: Making apparent and available a second grounding of
human identity by specifying the dynamics of subjective and objective
aspects of consciousness.
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3. Segment
Restoration in consciousness of the experience of the other as the self is
based on awareness of discrimination in consciousness of persons as other
than self. For example, I care more about my "child" man all children.
Horizontal Intervention: Emphasis, for the practitioner, is on
fostering in the client, clear interpersonal or social boundaries; people
become perceived as "other" according to their roles and are more or
less valued for the behavior defined by the role. The client comes to
understand and to feel that persons are separate entities, who are
assigned different social contributions and are fairly or unfairly
stratified in their value for these behaviors. The client is encouraged
to comprehend that their sense of personhood and mental health is
determined by role competence.
Vertical Intervention: Cultivating the perception mat all persons are
the same, even though social differentiation is a necessary activity,
provides the individual with a stable grounding for its self-perception.
For example, someone else may be hired for the job and may, in fact,
be better suited for the job, but self value is not contingent on role
value. Regard for the other or the self in relation to the other, is not
limited by the social designation.
Significance: Otherness, the perception of the other as separate, is viewed
as a functional imperative for human group life, but it is superseded by
the capacity for felt appreciation of all persons — the self as the other —
and in that brings an expansive satisfaction with life.
4. Transform
Attend presupposes the individual's developmental capacity for
experiencing the bifurcation of consciousness into subject and object;
transform presupposes the individual's understanding of this distinction
for enhanced adaptation through the discipline required for maintaining
mis state of self-awareness.
Horizontal Intervention: Efforts are toward promoting client's
discipline of role maintenance or reformation.
Vertical Intervention: Efforts are toward cultivating in the client, the
practice of transformation—the shift from "I am a stockbroker" to "I
have a role as a stockbroker." Role is not replaced, but is reorganized
in a broader meaning context of the self.
Significance: Transform enhances adaptation by facilitating
independence from external societal reinforcements as a source of self-
value. Transform shifts the clients awareness from knowledge to praxis.
Routine practice on the balance beam fosters strength of muscle, grace,
and conformity to the image of what is possible, but these are the products
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of discipline. Enhanced adaptation requires a conscious effort and
discipline of mind, one that makes the client a vigilant onlooker to its own
behaviors, and who continuously anchors its value in the seer, rather than
in what it sees.
5. Sense
Humans, except at a very primordial level, relate less directly to the
world, and more to the meanings they assign to the world. Sense refers to
the human capacity for realization of sensory experience as conditioned
reaction.
Horizontal Intervention: The practitioner focuses on the client's
feelings in their own right, regardless of their origins.
Vertical Intervention: The practitioner focuses on feelings as less
primordial and more as sensory reactions, interpretations of sense —
impersonal. For example, a person may prefer shrimp to caviar,
because of the availability of one or the other due to economic status
or geographical location. These preferences certainly feel personal,
but they are acquired as learned tastes in food. Or, in some cultures,
persons are taught to feel heroic, stoical, indifferent, or to exude great
emotion at the stimulus of pain. The human can feel grief or joy at
the loss of its own life or the life of another, depending on the
meaning it has learned to assign to sense for the sake of human
cooperation. The human must be predictable in its behaviors toward
itself and others or it becomes anxious. For example, we count on a
law enforcement agent to act in a given way to others, and the person
anticipates how others expect him/her to act The practitioner fosters
the realization in the client of the personal as impersonal and that
action is actually reaction (a conditioned response).
Significance: This presupposition restores subjectivity to the actor; action
replaces reaction through recognition of conditioned sensory response.
6. Residual
A capability of consciousness that reveals the developmental significance
of role-linked learned behaviors, is the forerunner of a continuous state of
wonderment.
Horizontal Intervention: The practitioner underscores importance of
role competence as an end in itself and for well-functioning human
experience.
Vertical Intervention: The practitioner cultivates in the client, respect
for role maintenance, restoration, modification, and resocialization,
strictly as developmentally significant in a larger and continuing
developmental process.
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Significance: Prioritizes states of consciousness as developmental and
each stage is indispensable to total human experience.
7. Judge
Judge presupposes the realization of conditional life fulfillment as a step
toward a total perspective and enjoyment of human experience. Judge
points to the capacity of consciousness to find worth in experience versus
bestowing worth on experience. Judge points to the movement in
consciousness toward satisfaction with the way things are, rather than in
as they should be and toward the assumption that the same energies drive
all aspects of life.
Horizontal Intervention: Identity is treated as having conditional
value; worth is deemed findable in experience. The client learns
under what conditions, "things are good or satisfying." For example,
the rain is bad because it causes colds and makes driving difficult
Contentment depends on avoiding the rain.
Vertical Intervention: The practitioner cultivates receptivity in the
client to conditional fulfillment with occasional euphoria and in
doing so illuminates the human capacity for bestowing worth on
experience, for static euphoria and for enjoyment in the moment
Satisfaction is portrayed as accessible in the present state of affairs,
no matter what it might be.
Significance: Expansive satisfaction and fulfillment is attainable in the
present as opposed to in the future through infatuation with things simply
as they are.
8. Motive
Motive presupposes that at one level of self-consciousness, the world and
others are perceived as objects to be manipulated towards one's own self-
preservation. Happiness is always dependent on something else. For
example, the person who is his or her student role, as opposed to acting in
the student role is unfulfilled until s/he achieves a good grade, or gets a
credential. The sense of wholeness is not in the moment; persons and
things are viewed as having instrumental value. Motive signals the realm
of non-linear relationship where the person is satisfied with itself
independent of its socially valued situation. In the movie, Shawshank
Redemption, two characters represent horizontal and vertical adaptation.
The prison inmate released from the penitentiary, commits suicide
because he is aware of himself only in his role as inmate. The banker
falsely accused of murder and incarcerated loses a highly respectable role
and takes on a deviant role; neither role determines his ability to value
himself. Role as social differentiation of behavior is an occasion for the
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expression of intrinsic value in contrast to human value derived from role.
Horizontal Intervention: Focus is on an anticipatory state of security
and reliance on others for self-affirmation. Instrumental orientation
emphasizes gaining means to an end; linear consciousness drives an
achievement/doing orientation for self-satisfaction.
Vertical Intervention: To cultivate a state of "is," contentment in the
moment, confirmation through what a person is already, and of
finding experience as intrinsically, not extrinsically of value.
Significance: Fosters fulfillment in being as opposed to doing. Human
action is premised on the expression of inherent value rather than on
seeking to obtain value from something outside of itself.
9. Consolidate
Consolidate presupposes the individual's capacity for bringing together
conditioned and unconditioned knowledge of the self toward individual
integrity and toward making society a reflection of human value in
contrast to a sought after source of human value.
Horizontal Intervention: Clinical practice underscores, for the client,
a defensive posture, as, for example, in an individual's attempt to
insure society's equal distribution of social value/rewards. Gender
and racial equality, might be sought after as an act of desperation, as
if the well-being of the person depends directly on these fair
allocations of value.
Vertical Intervention: Equality for persons according to their merits
is conveyed as a reflection of intrinsic value rather than as a source of
human value.
Significance: A person who develops the ability to integrate experience
so that all things are somehow perceived as good as opposed to the
enjoyment of only good things, has implication for society and its
members. Such a person is disinterested enough to style society and to
construct relationships and identities for the good of all because she/he is
independent of all. Also, such a person might be thought of as a hero in
society, perhaps even the subject of a legend, or someone who represents
the extraordinary, when, actually, she/he merely represents attributes of
human development potentially available in every person.
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NOTES
1. To fully appreciate clinical sociology's unique, specific, and explicit
commitments, one can refer first to David J. Kallen (1995) who notes that a
paradigm shift in sociology which took place before and after World War II
changed the emphasis in the field to the development of theory without regard
for how it was used. A consequence of this respecification was the emergence
of a sociological practice sub-field as a way of restoring what was lost or
disassociated in the de-emphasis of practical application in the discipline of
sociology.
2. Clinical sociologists, in general, define their work as the use of
sociological theory and method to intervene at one or more levels, of human
experience, that include individual as well as group, community, or society
(Eve 1990).
3. In her 1990 examination of the development of contemporary clinical
sociology, Elizabeth J. Clark claimed that it had been only in the last decade
mat the sub-field of clinical sociology had been legitimized.
4. A stage of development should not be thought of as qualitatively
better or worse than another stage; rather, each stage corresponds to a specific
set of behavioral outcomes.
5. The case of Forest Beech, for the most part, is an actual account that
incorporates fictitious names.
6. It is important to note, theoretically, according to Durkheim (1964)
that "society" exists sui generis (in its own right), meaning while the
individual represents, in its individual behaviors, a part of the whole
(roles/statuses, institutions), the whole (like the sound of all the musicians
playing in a symphony) cannot be found in the individual. Emphasizing the
individual in the dialectical process of the relationship of the individual to the
group has implication for social and individual change, to a greater extent
when the focus is on how the individual makes society man when it is on how
society makes the individual.
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